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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
going on. If constructive notice is sufficient it places on electric
light companies an unreasonable burden which requires a constant
lookout over all vacant property or building operations which is too
strict a rule to apply.7 But apparently the burden has been placed
on electric light companies operating under conditions similar to
the defendant.
G. H. M.
NEGLIGENcE-FooD----FOREIGN SUBSTANcE-AGRICULTURE AND
MARKETS LAW.-A servant living with his master was injured by
swallowing broken pieces of glass about the size of beans, apparently
contained in an unchipped bottle of cream delivered to the master's
house. There was evidence to show that glass was in the bottle after
some of the cream had been used and that the cereal did not contain
any broken glass. The dairy introduced evidence respecting the
customary safety tests surrounding the bottling of the cream.
The court charged the jury that there was an implied warranty
that the cream contained no deleterious substance harmful to the
person who used it. Upon appeal, after verdict for plaintiff, the
Appellate Division recognizing that such an implied warranty applies
only to the benefit of the purchaser,1 affirmed the verdict because it
felt that the error did not affect the result since there was negligence
present as a matter of law, being inferred on the theory that Section
50 of the Agriculture and Markets Law applies to the facts here.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, that the Agriculture
Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N. Y. 345, dissenting opinion of
Crane, C. J.
'Giminez v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191
N. E. 27 (1934).
There are many jurisdictions which hold that an implied warranty follows
through the dealer to the purchaser or ultimate consumer, Dothan Chero-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 So. 734 (1918); Watson v.
Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S. E. 152 (1905) ; Parks v. C. C. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food
Co., 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916); Catani v. Swift Co., 251 Pa. 52,
95 Atl. 931 (1915); Madden v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 106
Pa. Super. Ct. 474, 162 Atl. 687 (1932) ; Mazeth v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
662, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
Cases holding no warranty except to original purchaser: Birmingham
Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921); Flacconio
v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 Atl. 510 (1917) ; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269,
128 Atl. 186 (1925); McCaffrey v. Mossherg and Branville Mfg. Co., 23 R. I.
381, 50 AtI. 651 (1901) ; Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545,
179 S. W. 155 (1915).
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and Markets Law 2 did not apply to the facts under consideration
since the provisions of the law were not intended to be aimed at
foreign substances such as stones, tacks or broken glass which do not
"masquerade as cream" but were designed to preserve the quality of
the liquid and to establish its standard, that where the issue had been
sent to the jury on the wrong theory (implied warranty rather than
common law negligence) the verdict should be reversed, no matter
how strong the evidence was either for or against the plaintiff.
Aime Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N. Y. 1, 196 N. E.
617 (1935).
In holding that the Agriculture and Markets Law was inap-
plicable the court strictly construed the statute since it is penal in
nature 3 and derogatory of the common law. Apparently if the glass
had been "ground glass" 4 and as such a part of the cream, the de-
cision would have followed the case of Pine Grove Poultry Farms
Inc. v. Newtown By-Products Co.,5 which held that wire ground up
in chicken feed became a part of the feed and accordingly the Agri-
culture and Markets Law was applicable. These two cases indicate
when the foreign substance is not of such a nature that it becomes
part of the food product, the person seeking damages must rely on
common law negligence or implied warranty and not on the Agri-
culture and Markets Law. Proof of foreign substance in a food
package not tampered with makes out a prima facie case of manu-
facturer's negligence, which if not overborne by manufacturer's evi-
dence, is sufficient to sustain a verdict for the injured consumer. 6
If all the possibilities that the foreign substance might have entered
the container after opening were excluded it seems that res ipsa
loquitur would apply.7 Such circumstances border on negligence in
law although it has been held that even where a statute prohibited
the sale of adulterated food, it was not intended to impose on the
'Section 50 of the Agriculture and Markets Law reads: "No person shall
sell or exchange or offer or expose for sale or exchange, any unclean, impure,
unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk or any cream from the same, or
any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated, colored, or unwholesome cream, or
sell or exchange, or offer or expose for sale or exchange, any substance in
imitation or semblance of cream, which is not cream, nor shall he sell or
exchange, or offer or expose for sale or exchange any such substance as and
for cream * * *"
' People v. Wright, 19 Misc. 135, 43 N. Y. Supp. 290 (1897) ; People v.
McDermitt Bunger, 38 Misc. 365, 77 N. Y. Supp. 888 (1902).
'Crane, C. J., in the dissenting opinion held that the Agriculture and
Markets Law was applicable. This opinion, however, stated the glass to be
"ground glass". The majority opinion indicated that the glass was not ground
but in larger sizes, from which it might be assumed that their decision might
have been different had the glass been ground. Apparently the evidence was
somewhat conflicting as evidenced by the two different opinions.
2248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928).
Norfolk Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 173 S. E.
497 (1934) ; Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis (Va.) 175 S. E. 743 (1934).
'Rost v. Kee & C. Dairy Co., 216 Ill. App. 497, 47 A. L. R. 148 (1920).
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producer absolute civil responsibility of insurer where every reason-
able means designed to guarantee the safety of the food for normal
use had been employed."
G. F. J.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw-BONA FIDE PURCHASER-
NEGLIGENcE.-Negotiable bonds, stolen from the petitioner, were
eventually purchased by the respondent, a dealer, who claims title as
a holder in due course, having paid value before it noticed that the
bonds were stolen property. The petitioner shows that at some time
prior to the purchase, the respondent had received a memorandum
describing the stolen bonds, and had been negligent in failing to
make proper provisions for noting the contents of this notice of the
theft. It is claimed that had the respondent used due diligence with
regard to this notice, it would have known, before it paid value, that
the bonds were stolen property, and would thus have been placed
upon notice. Prior to this case the Illinois Supreme Court 1 had de-
nied an application for certiorari to review a decision of the Illinois
Appellate Court, which had held that receipt of notice of theft was
conclusive evidence of bad faith.2 The petitioner urges that since
federal courts must accept a definite construction of a state's Nego-
tiable Instruments Law by that state's highest court,3 this court is
bound by the decision in Northwestern National Bank v. Madison
& Kedzie State Bank,4 to declare that the respondent is not a bona
fide holder in due course. On appeal, held, affirmed for the respon-
dent. One may purchase stolen negotiable bonds and acquire valid
title as a holder in due course, although before the purchase, notice
of the theft had come to him-provided he acts in good faith and
does not wilfully avoid knowledge of its contents. Graham v. White-
Phillips Co., Inc., 296 U. S. 27, 56 Sup. Ct. 21 (1935). 5
In construing the Negotiable Instruments Law, only the deci-
sions of the highest courts of the states are binding upon federal
8Cheli v. Cudahy Brothers Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934).
' The highest court of the state of Illinois.
-'Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 242 I1.
App. 22.
"Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487, 54 Sup. Ct. 813 (1934);
Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 22 Fed. 191 (C. C. A. 6th, 1892)
Koblyn v. Hoffman, 229 Fed. 486 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; United Divers Supply
Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 289 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923) ; Gutelius v.
Stanbon, 39 F. (2d) 621 (D. C. Mass. 1930).
'Supra note 2.
5 Affirming White-Phillips Co., Inc. v. Graham, 74 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A.
7th, 1934).
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